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THE CASE FOR THE LEGISLATIVE
OVERRIDE
Nicholas Stephanopoulos*
What is the optimal arrangement of judicial review? Most
scholars who have addressed this question have assumed that there
are only two important alternatives: judicial supremacy and parlia-
mentary sovereignty. The literature has neglected the conceptual
space that exists between these two poles, in particular the innova-
tive legislative override model. This article describes and evaluates
the experiences of the two countries that have adopted the override,
Canada and Israel. It also introduces a refined override model that
promises to protect fundamental rights while promoting democratic
decision-making. Finally, the article explains which institutional
and political contexts are hospitable to the override and which are
not.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine two hypothetical laws that the U.S. Congress might pass. The
first, the National Security Act of 2006, seeks to combat terrorism by author-
izing the President to detain indefinitely any person whom he deems a threat
to the nation's safety. Under the statute, the government only needs to pro-
vide some evidence that a person endangers national security, and the person
may then be detained until he is determined no longer to pose a threat. The
second law, the Better Neighbors Act of 2006, aims to reduce violence
against Muslim-Americans by making it a federal crime to be in possession
of a weapon within 200 feet of a mosque. What would the fate of these two
statutes-both duly passed by Congress and signed into law by the Presi-
dent-be?
Under the U.S. system of judicial review, of course, the Supreme Court
would eventually have the chance to evaluate both statutes' constitutionality.
And based on recent precedent, it is likely that both laws would be invali-
dated. The National Security Act probably runs afoul of the Court's holding
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that a citizen may be deprived of his liberty only after
being afforded "a fair opportunity to rebut the [g]overnment's factual asser-
251
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tions before a neutral decisionmaker."' The Better Neighbors Act is probably
outside the scope of Congress's lawmaking authority under either the Com-
merce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The possession of
weapons near mosques is no more related to interstate commerce than the
possession of guns near schools,2 and no more congruent and proportional to
constitutional violations than violence by private actors against women.3
Under the American model of judicial review, then, both statutes would
likely meet a quick end at the hands of the Supreme Court.
The statutes' fate, though, would be very different under other models
of judicial review. Under the traditional British system, Parliament is re-
strained in the laws that it can pass only by its own better judgment. With
no written constitution to limit the legislature's lawmaking options, the Na-
tional Security Act and the Better Neighbors Act would both unquestionably
be valid. Under the modern British and New Zealand systems, on the other
hand, courts would do their best to interpret the two statutes in accordance
with the European Convention on Human Rights and the New Zealand Bill
of Rights, respectively. If the statutes could not be reconciled with the Con-
vention or Bill of Rights, they would remain good law but, in Britain, courts
would declare them incompatible with the Convention.4 In Germany, the
statutes would be stricken if they are held unconstitutional by the courts, and
would also be unrescuable even by constitutional amendment if they are
1Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). In addition, the National Security Act could
be construed as making it a crime to "threaten" national security, in which case all the proce-
dural protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments would have to be provided. Cf
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
2 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding unconstitutional as beyond Con-
gress' Commerce Clause power a federal statute banning the possession of firearms within
1000 feet of a school).
3 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding unconstitutional as beyond
Congress' Section 5 power a federal statute creating a civil remedy for victims of gender-
related violence).
4 For more information on the modem British and New Zealand systems of judicial review,
see KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC
DIALOGUE 62-64 (2001); Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitu-
tionalism, 49 Am. J. COMP. L. 707, 727-39 (2001); Michael Perry, Protecting Human Rights in
a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 667-69 (2003); Kate
Malleson, A British Bill of Rights: Incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights,
in JUDICIAL POWER AND CANADIAN DEMOCRACY 27, 37 (Paul Howe & Peter H. Russell eds.,
2001). In Britain, a court's declaration of a statute's incompatibility with the Convention is
non-binding, but is expected to prompt Parliament to amend the statute. Gardbaum, supra, at
733-34.
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found to violate certain unamendable constitutional provisions.5 Finally, in
Canada and Israel, the statutes would be invalidated if found unconstitu-
tional-but the legislature could then override the courts' holdings through
new majority votes indicating its desire to pass the laws "notwithstanding"
their conflict with the Charter or Basic Law.
The fate of the National Security Act and the Better Neighbors Act is
therefore highly linked to the applicable system of judicial review. Depend-
ing on the legal regime, the statutes might be automatically valid, valid but
construed to avoid conflict with quasi-entrenched rights, invalid but redeem-
able through future legislation, invalid but redeemable through constitutional
amendment, or invalid with no possibility of rescue. Which of these out-
comes is best? In other words, what is the optimal arrangement of judicial
review for a country? This article argues that a variant of the Cana-
dian/Israeli legislative override model is generally the best choice. The leg-
islative override has functioned reasonably well in practice, and if revised
somewhat it promises to protect fundamental rights while still allowing de-
mocratic expression on constitutional issues.
Importantly, this article approaches the issue of comparative judicial re-
view from an ex ante perspective, rather than with an eye toward any par-
ticular country's legal and political situation. Though I refer frequently to
the two hypothetical U.S. statutes introduced above, I do so only because ex-
amples help to illustrate the differences between the legislative override sys-
tem and other arrangements of judicial review. My argument is not that the
United States (or any other nation) should necessarily adopt the legislative
override model, but rather that a country operating behind a veil of igno-
rance-and hence not subject to the transition costs that a country with an
established judicial review system would incur-should choose the over-
ride.6 Constitutional draftsmanship, not the future of American judicial re-
view, is this article's overriding concern.
The article begins on a descriptive note, by summarizing in Part I the
experiences of the two countries that have adopted the legislative override,
Canada and Israel. Part II transitions into theory. It discusses the values that
systems of judicial review aim to secure, and presents the constitutional ar-
rangement-a legislative override system, based loosely on the Canadian
and Israeli models-that promises to best achieve these values. The Part
5These unamendable provisions are GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.) ("The
dignity of man is inviolable.") and GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art.20 (F.R.G.) ("The
Federal Republic of Germany shall be a democratic and social federal state.").
6 See infra Part IV, for analysis of the implications of transition costs for the choice among
different judicial review models.
HeinOnline  -- 10 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff.  253 2005
also positions the proposed model within the academic literature on judicial
review and the countermajoritarian difficulty. Part III, the analytical heart of
the article, uses the hypothetical National Security Act and Better Neighbors
Act to compare the legislative override system to its rivals, in terms of both
values secured and incentives generated for different institutional actors.
The Part also returns to the Canadian and Israeli examples in order to evalu-
ate them and explain how they might have been improved under the system
proposed in Part II. Finally, Part IV examines the applicability of the legis-
lative override model to different institutional, political, and cultural settings.
It contends that the override is generally a country's best option, but that it
may not be an appropriate choice for nations that have recently endured the
abuse of a minority at the hands of a majority, or that already possess other
well-established judicial review systems.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE IN PRACTICE
Before examining the legislative override's theoretical advantages over
other arrangements of judicial review, it is worth looking at how the coun-
tries that have adopted the override have fared with it. This look abroad is
especially important because American scholars have so far paid little atten-
tion to the Canadian and Israeli experiences with the override, and because
even in Canada "so little has been written about [the override,] the most
unique feature of the Charter.",7 In this Part, I describe the most prominent
uses (and attempted uses) of the legislative override in Canada and Israel. I
attempt no evaluation here, as analysis of the Canadian and Israeli examples
is more sensibly undertaken after this article's variant of the Canadian/Israeli
model has been introduced.8
A. Canada
The Canadian legislative override (also known as the "notwithstanding"
clause) emerged from heated backroom talks in November 1981 among the
provincial premiers and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Trudeau had long
wished for Canada to have a written constitution, and he pressed hard for the
adoption of the Charter in 1980-82. Many of the provincial governments,
though, were reluctant to surrender power, either to Ottawa or to the judici-
ary. Saskatchewan, Newfoundland, and Alberta, notably, insisted on the leg-
7 Tsvi Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 221, 221
(2002).
8 For analysis of the Canadian and Israeli experiences with the override, see infra Sections III.
C and HI. D.
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islative override as the sine qua non of their consent to the Charter. (Quebec
and Manitoba, both of which opposed the Charter outright, were not repre-
sented at these negotiations. Quebec had taken a hard line on provincial
sovereignty, while the Manitoban Premier was an outspoken critic of en-
trenched bills of rights.) In the end, a deal was reached in which "the prov-
inces traded the amending formula [i.e. the override] for the charter." 9 Even
with the override agreed upon, debate swirled around precisely to which
provisions of the Charter the notwithstanding clause should be applied. The
federal delegation was adamant that language rights be placed beyond the
override's ambit, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland were satisfied with ap-
plying the notwithstanding clause only to sections 7-15 of the Charter (legal
and equality rights), while Alberta insisted on also applying the override to
the fundamental freedoms of section 2.10
The provision that eventually materialized in the wake of this horse-
trading-section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms-
allows both the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures to "ex-
pressly declare" by a simple majority that a law "shall operate notwithstand-
ing a provision included in section 2 or sections 7-15 of [the] Charter."'" A
law may be passed "notwithstanding" the Charter whether or not a court has
already ruled it unconstitutional. Sections 2 and 7-15 of the Charter include
many but not all of the Charter's most important rights guarantees: the fun-
damental freedoms of section 2 (conscience, religion, expression, assembly,
etc.), the legal rights of sections 7-14 (life, liberty, security, freedom from
search and seizure, etc.), and the equality rights of section 15 ("equal protec-
tion and equal benefit of the law")-but not democratic rights, mobility
rights, language rights, or education rights.12 In addition, an override
"cease[s] to have effect five years after it comes into force," but may be re-
enacted by the legislature upon its expiration.3
It did not take long after the Charter's passage for the legislative over-
ride to be used. The Quebec National Assembly enacted Bill 62, An Act Re-
specting the Constitution Act,14 just nine weeks after the Charter came into
effect. This law attached an override provision to every Quebec statute on
the books at that point, thereby immunizing the entire Quebec statutory code
9 Howard Leeson, Section 33, the Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?, in JUDICIAL
POWER AND CANADIAN DEMOCRACY 297, 311 (Paul Howe & Peter H. Russell eds., 2001).
1O Id.
ICONSTITUTION ACT, 1981, § 33 (Can.).
2 1d. §§ 2,7-15.
13 Id § 33.
14 An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, R.S.Q., ch. L-4.2 (1982).
255
HeinOnline  -- 10 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff.  255 2005
10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 250 (2005)
from constitutional challenge on the basis of § 2 and §§ 7-15 of the Charter.
As Christopher Manfredi writes, "Bill 62 forcefully confirmed Quebec's
continued opposition both to the process that produced the Constitution Act,
1982, and to the substance of the new constitution."' 15 The ruling Parti Qu&
b6cois continued attaching notwithstanding clauses to each new law until its
replacement in office by the Quebec Liberals in 1985. In the courts, the
Quebec Court of Appeal found that the omnibus use of the legislative over-
ride was invalid because "the fundamental freedoms and legal guarantees
which may be disregarded ... are so important that they should be expressly
stated so as to bring into sharp focus the effect of the overriding provisions
and the rights deprived." 16 However, the Quebec Court of Appeal was over-
ruled by the Canadian Supreme Court in Ford v. Quebec,7 where the Su-
preme Court held that "a s. 33 declaration is sufficiently express if it refers to
the number of the [Charter] section ... to be overridden."' 8 After Ford, it
was established that the override could be used preemptively, and that it re-
quired only a formal mention of the Charter provisions being overridden.19
The second important use of the legislative override was by Saskatche-
wan in 1986.20 The Saskatchewan Government Employees' Union (SGEU)
had launched a series of rotating strikes in the fall of 1985, in an effort to
pressure the government into agreeing to a new labor contract. A mediator
released a compromise proposal to end the strikes in January 1986, but the
SGEU rejected the plan. Saskatchewan Premier Grant Devine then decided
to force the SGEU back to work through legislation. The resulting statute,
Bill 144, contained a notwithstanding clause applying to § 2(d) of the Char-
ter, which protects the freedom of association. In 1984, the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal had nullified a provincial law ordering dairy workers back
to their jobs, and Devine and the legislature wanted to avoid a similar fate
for Bill 144.21
15 CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CHARTER; CANADA AND THE
PARADOX OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 176 (2001).
16 Alliance des Professeurs de Montreal v. Attorney-General of Quebec, [1985] D.L.R. 354.
17 Ford v. Quebec, [1988] S.C.R. 712.
" Id. at 715.
19 For an in-depth discussion of Ford v. Quebec, see Lorraine E. Weinrib, Learning to Live
with the Override, 35 MCGILL L.J. 541 (1990).
20 For infonnation on Saskatchewan's use of the override, see generally MICHAEL MANDEL,
THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA 77 (1989);
MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 185; Leeson, supra note 9, at 314-15.
21 See MANDEL, supra note 20, at 77; MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 185; Leeson, supra note 9,
at 314-15.
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Quebec again exercised its override power in 1988, in what remains the
most controversial use of the notwithstanding clause. In Ford v. Quebec, the
Canadian Supreme Court had not only ruled that a blanket legislative over-
ride was permissible, but had also stricken Quebec's Bill 101, which prohib-
ited the use of English on commercial signs. According to the Court, Bill
101 abridged the freedom of expression protected in § 2(b) of the Charter,
and "the exclusive use of French has not been ... justified" by Quebec's in-
terest in preserving the province's "visage linguistique. 22 Within a week of
the Court's decision in Ford, the Quebec legislature passed a new statute,
Bill 178, that invoked the notwithstanding clause and re-authorized Que-
bec's policy banning English on commercial signs. (Bill 178 did represent a
partial compromise, in that English was banned on exterior signs, but al-
lowed on interior commercial signs.2 3) Quebec's francophone majority
cheered this use of the legislative override, but the reaction elsewhere in
Canada was sharply negative. Three English-speaking ministers resigned in
protest from Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa's cabinet. Canadian Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney blasted section 33 of the Charter as the "major fatal
flaw of 1981," and declared that any constitution "that does not protect the
inalienable and imprescriptible rights of individual Canadians is not worth
the paper it is written on.",24 And Manitoba Premier Gary Filmon reacted by
withdrawing a resolution to ratify the Meech Lake constitutional accord
from the province's legislature, thereby fatally undermining the accord's
prospects for national ratification. Interestingly, Quebec allowed the over-
ride to expire in 1993, and the new legislation passed by the legislature
closely resembled the policy implicitly approved by the Court in Ford,
namely the predominant but not exclusive use of French on outdoor signs.25
For more than a decade after Quebec's 1988 use of the override, no Ca-
nadian legislature invoked the notwithstanding clause, causing many com-
mentators to view it as a dead letter. In 1999, though, Alberta preemptively
exercised its override power in a statute defiming marriage as a union of a
man and a woman. There had been no Court decision requiring the Albertan
government to recognize same-sex marriages, but the legislature was con-
22 Ford v. Quebec, [1988] S.C.R. 712, 780 (emphasis added).
23 Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa believed that this approach gave sufficient weight to the
rights of the English-speaking minority in Quebec. See ROACH, supra note 4, at 190.
24 Patrick James et al., Introduction: The Myth of the Sacred in the Canadian Constitutional
Order, in THE MYTH OF THE SACRED: THE CHARTER, THE COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF THE
CONSTITUTION fN CANADA 3, 3 (Patrick James et al. eds., 2002).
25 Ford, [1988] S.C.R. at 717 ("[R]equiring the predominant display of the French language,
even its marked predominance, would be proportional to the goal of promoting and maintain-
ing a French 'visage linguistique' in Quebec .... ").
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cerned that a future Court ruling might do SO. z 6 The Supreme Court had re-
cently decided the case of M v. H.,27 in which it concluded that same-sex
couples were entitled to the same social and economic benefits as married
couples. In response, Alberta wanted to send "a clear message to the court
system ... that any move to change the definition of marriage would be a
mistaken interpretation of the intent of the Legislature and the Charter.,
28
Surprisingly, Alberta's use of the override in the contentious context of
same-sex marriage attracted little attention in the rest of Canada, probably
because of a "lack of public awareness of the legislation.,
29
In addition to these four notable uses of the legislative override, there
have also been numerous minor exercises of the override power, mostly by
Quebec. Tsvi Kahana notes that Quebec has used the override twelve times
with little or no public attention: "[T]he twelve ignored uses of the [notwith-
standing clause] in Quebec were not mentioned-still less discussed, ana-
lyzed, or criticized-in two of Quebec's main newspapers. 30 These twelve
uses were all preemptive, were all provisions within much longer bills, and
all dealt with pension plans, education, or agricultural development. 31 Out-
side Quebec, the Yukon Territory used the legislative override, again with no
public attention, to shield a bill regulating nominations to the Land Planning
Board and Committees from constitutional scrutiny.32
On a few occasions, furthermore, use of the override was debated but
subsequently rejected by Canadian legislatures. In March 1998, Alberta
considered invoking the notwithstanding clause to shield a bill compensating
victims of the province's eugenics laws from constitutional challenge on the
grounds that it impermissibly prohibited victims from suing for additional
compensation. A loud outcry ensued, causing the Albertan Premier to with-
draw the notwithstanding clause from the bill, and state that "it became
abundantly clear that ... the use of any tool... to undermine [the Charter] is
something that should be used only in very, very rare circumstances. 3 3 A
26 See Tsvi Kahana, The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons from
the Ignored Practice of Section 33 of the Charter, 44 CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
255, 273 (2001).27 M. v. H., [1999] S.C.R 3.
28 ALBERTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, DEBATES (2000).
29 Kahana, supra note 26, at 273. Kahana also notes that the override was probably unconsti-
tutional since "marriage and divorce is a federal rather than a provincial responsibility and
section 33 does not apply to that part of the Constitution." Id at 268.
30 Id. at 259.
31 Id at 258.32 
Id.
33 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 187-88.
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few weeks later, the Alberta legislature again turned its attention to the over-
ride after the Canadian Supreme Court handed down its decision in Vriend v.
Alberta,34 where it "read in" sexual orientation as a factor on the basis of
which the provincial government could not legally discriminate. The Al-
berta legislature had purposely excluded sexual orientation from its human
rights code and strongly opposed the Court's ruling, but was unable to use
the override because of the earlier controversy over the eugenics victim com-
pensation bill.35 Finally, the federal Parliament considered invoking the not-
withstanding clause in response to a Supreme Court decision invalidating its
ban on tobacco advertising on freedom of the press grounds.36 Despite strong
popular opposition to the ruling-as well as the fact that tobacco advertising
was one of the specific cases where the drafters of the Charter had thought
that an override would be appropriate-Parliament deferred to the Court and
re-drafted its legislation in accordance with the Court's ruling.37
B. Israel
Israel's history with the legislative override is far more limited than
Canada's. Questions linger, in fact, about whether Israel's Basic Law
amounts to an entrenched legal document at all, and whether the Knesset can
be bound by a constraint purely of its own making. I do not address here the
nature of the Basic Law, but rather note that the Knesset has effectively con-
ceded to the Israeli Supreme Court the power to nullify statutes inconsistent
with the Basic Law. In Bergman v. Minister of Finance,38 Agudat Derekh
Eretz v. Broadcasting Authority,39 and a handful of other cases, the Supreme
Court invalidated laws duly passed by the Knesset without ever having its
power to do so challenged.4°
34 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.R. 493.
35 It is also unclear whether using the override to disregard Vriend would have been that po-
litically advantageous for Albertan politicians. "Two-thirds of Albertans in a poll conducted
for the government supported the decision not to use the notwithstanding clause." MANFREDI,
supra note 15, at 196.36 R.J.R-MacDonald v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 199.
37 Leeson, supra note 9, at 320 & n.62.
38 HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance and Others [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693.
39 HCJ 246/81, 260/81 Agudat Derekh Eretz v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 1.
40 These judgments all recommended changes to the nullified statutes that would eliminate
their conflict with the Basic Law. The Knesset accepted the Court's recommendations, re-
passing the laws with those revisions.
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Israel's legislative override emerged in the aftermath of its 1992 "con-
stitutional revolution. ' 1 Whereas the chapters of the Basic Law had only
dealt with the institutional structure of the Israeli government up until that
point, two new chapters dealing with individual rights were added in 1992:
Human Dignity and Liberty, and Freedom of Occupation. Soon after these
chapters were added, the Court ruled in Meatreal v. Prime Minister42 that the
government's refusal to allow a private company to import non-Kosher fro-
zen meat violated the right of freedom of occupation. Unwilling to abandon
the policy of non-importation of non-Kosher meat, the religious parties in
the Knesset urged that changes be made to the Basic Law itself. Thanks to
their pressure, the Knesset added a notwithstanding clause to the Freedom of
Occupation chapter of the Basic Law in March 1994. That chapter now
states that "a statutory provision which infringes freedom of occupation will
be valid .... if it is included in a statute enacted by a majority of the Knesset
members and expressly declares that it is valid despite the Basic Law., 43 In
addition, uses of the notwithstanding clause expire after four years unless
they are re-authorized by the Knesset. Israel's legislative override, therefore,
requires a simple majority, is restricted to the Knesset, may be used preemp-
tively, requires only general "notwithstanding" language, applies only to the
right to freedom of occupation, and has a four-year sunset provision.
Ironically, the day that the Knesset incorporated the legislative override
into the Freedom of Occupation chapter of the Basic Law is also the only
time that the override has been used to date. Immediately after amending the
Basic Law to include the notwithstanding clause provision, the Knesset
passed the Import of Frozen Meat Law, 44 declaring that, despite the Court's
judgment to the contrary, non-Kosher frozen meat could not be imported
into Israel. Meatreal, the same plaintiff that had brought the original petition
challenging the government's meat importation policy, subsequently sued
again. In Meatreal v. Knesset,45 the Israeli Supreme Court, following in the
footsteps of its Canadian counterpart in Ford v. Quebec, found that use of
the notwithstanding clause immunizes Knesset statutes from attack on the
grounds that they conflict with the Basic Law. Since this ruling, the Knesset
has made no further use of its override power. It had an opportunity to do so
when its Investment Portfolio Managers' Law was nullified by the Court be-
41 Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial Review
vs. Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH L. REv. 415,432 (2000).
42 HCJ 3872/93 Meatreal v. Prime Minister [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 485.
43 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1992, S.H. 150.
44 The Import of Frozen Meat Law, 1994, S.H. 104.
4' HCJ 4676/94 Meatreal v. Knesset [1997] IsrSC 50(5) 15.
260
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cause the law's restrictions on working in the securities industry conflicted
with the right to freedom of occupation.46 However, the Knesset chose to
amend the law in accordance with the Court's decision rather than attempt to
override the ruling.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE IN THEORY
With the Canadian and Israeli experiences with the legislative override
in mind, it is possible to return to this article's central question: What is the
optimal arrangement of judicial review for a country? In this Part, I first lay
out the array of values that judicial review systems seek to secure. I then in-
troduce the arrangement-a variant of the Canadian and Israeli models-that
promises to attain the best combination of those values. Finally, I outline the
major positions in the academic debate about judicial review and the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty, and explain the legislative override's contribution
to the dialogue.
A. The Values at Stake
The question of what system of judicial review a nation should adopt is
essentially a constrained maximization problem. There are several values
that arrangements of judicial review aim to achieve, but there are tradeoffs
between schemes as to which values are attained and which are not. For ex-
ample, U.S.-style judicial review may do an excellent job of protecting fun-
damental rights, while less consistently allowing democratic majorities to
express their will on constitutional issues. Another system, such as British
parliamentary supremacy, may improve the correlation between public opin-
ion and public policy, but at some cost in the preservation of individual lib-
erties. The only way to choose among these and other arrangements is to
weigh the values' relative importance, predict the likely consequences of
each arrangement for each value, and then select the scheme that promises to
attain the optimal combination of values.
What, then, are these values that systems of judicial review strive to se-
cure, and how can they be prioritized? In rough order of importance,47 the
46 HCJ 1715/97 The Investment Portfolios Managers' Association v. Minister of Finance
[1997] IsrSC 51(4) 367.
4' Different people will rank these values in different ways. For me, the two most important
values must be the ones that constitute the term "liberal democracy," that is, the protection of
individual rights and the expression of the majority will. After these two, the richness of a
country's public discourse seems most significant, followed closely by the predictability and
stability of constitutional norms. I rank public discourse above legal stability because life is
probably better in a constitutionally volatile world characterized by informed, reasoned delib-
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following five values appear to be implicated in the decision of which sys-
tem of judicial review to adopt:48 First, the protection of fundamental indi-
vidual rights. In a liberal society that affirms the dignity and autonomy of
the individual, there is probably no goal more pressing for a system of judi-
cial review than the safeguarding of the individual's rights against the forces
(both public and private) that threaten them. By most accounts, these rights
are better protected by the judiciary than by any other branch; "judicial re-
view of constitutional rights ... places a higher priority on principled resolu-
tions than would be accorded by the bureaucracy or [legislature]."49
The second value that should be considered when choosing among sys-
tems of judicial review is a democratic majority's ability to have its wishes
enacted into law. As Janet Hiebert writes, "any society that aspires to be
democratic should resolve the most important of its social priorities through
its elected legislatures rather than in courts., 50 Democratic decision-making
is undermined by systems of judicial review that give courts the final say on
constitutional questions, and advanced by arrangements that allow legislative
and popular involvement in constitutional interpretation.
The third value at stake is the quality of discourse in a nation's public
sphere (including both institutional settings such as legislative debates, and
less formal contexts such as Op-Ed pages and group meetings). 51 Mark
Tushnet has argued convincingly that U.S.-style judicial review "debilitates"
public deliberation by forcing legislators to "act in the shadow of the courts'
constitutional interpretation," and causing "the public [to] find itself entirely
eration than in a constitutionally stable world marred by a barren public sphere. Finally, I
consider the quality of relations among the branches of government to be the least important
of these values; the U.S. system's "checks and balances" approach, for one, invites-and has
thrived despite-inter-branch discord.
48 One omission from this list of values is the fit of a system of judicial review with a coun-
try's historical and cultural experience. This consideration is omitted because it is unclear (in
the abstract) how fit varies across different judicial review models. See also, infra Part IV,
(arguing that the suitability of the legislative override for a particular country depends on that
country's historical experience and the transition costs that would be incurred in switching to
the override).
49 JANET L. HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS: WHAT IS PARLIAMENT'S ROLE? 24 (2002).
50 JANET L. HIEBERT, LIMITING RIGHTS: THE DILEMMA OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 115 (1996).
51 High-quality public discourse increases the information available to citizens, deepens their
connection to the state, and arguably improves public policy decisions. See generally JOSEPH
BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994); JAMES FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991); CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION
OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996).
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removed from the domain of constitutional discourse. 5 2 A system that em-
phasized non-judicial voices in the constitutional conversation, on the other
hand, would presumably improve the quality (and stakes) of public dis-
course.
The fourth value is the stability and predictability of constitutional
norms. As with other areas of the law, citizens, businesses, and legislatures
all benefit from being able to predict with a good deal of certainty what the
outcome in a given constitutional case will be. U.S.-style judicial review,
though not always predictable, is intrinsically more stable than "a regime in
which each ... election serves as a national referendum about ... constitu-
tional truth., 53 The final value implicated by the choice among judicial re-
view arrangements is the quality of relations between the different branches
of government. Judicial supremacy on constitutional issues may foster anger
by the other branches at having their policies nullified, and provoke retalia-
tion through constitutional amendment, court-packing, or outright disobedi-
ence. But greater legislative involvement in constitutional decision-making
soothes this frustration and "recognizes the need for dialogue and joint re-
sponsibility between legislatures and courts in protecting fundamental liber-
ties.",54 These, then, are the values that constitutional draftsmen must simul-
taneously maximize in the arrangement of judicial review that they select.
B. Pieces of the Puzzle
This article's thesis is that our draftsmen should choose the legislative
override system. Compared to U.S.-style judicial supremacy or British par-
liamentary sovereignty-or any other existing judicial review model-the
legislative override system attains a better combination of the above values.
Below I describe the six key provisions that I believe should be included in a
legislative override system, and discuss their likely consequences for the val-
ues implicated by judicial review. As will quickly become apparent, the six
provisions resemble the Canadian and Israeli overrides in some respects, but
substantially depart from them in others.
52 Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REv. 245,247,265,275 (1995).
53 Neal Devins, Reanimator: Mark Tushnet and the Second Coming of the Imperial Presi-
dency, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 359, 370 (2000).
54 Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 409,
434 (2003).
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1. Supermajority Requirement for the Legislative Override
The legislature should be able to override the Court's 55 judgment when
the Court invalidates a statute or executive action on constitutional
56
grounds. This power, the essence of the legislative override system, allows
democratic majorities to translate their policy positions into law, even in ar-
eas that raise constitutional questions. It also improves the quality of public
discourse by inviting legislators and the broader public to ponder constitu-
tional issues, and by offering a reason for debate to continue even after the
Court has reached its decision. 7
However, the legislative override power should require a supermajor-
ity-say, two-thirds or three-fourths of the legislative body-before it can be
exercised. This supermajority requirement, which does not exist in Canada
or Israel, serves two distinct purposes. First, and more importantly, it pre-
vents the legislative override from being used too lightly, or from becoming
an instrument for the deprivation of rights. If substantially more votes must
be mustered to exercise a legislative override than to pass a regular bill, the
override will only be used on the rare occasions when a Court ruling pro-
vokes broad public hostility and a legislative consensus against it. The de-
bate accompanying a measure that requires a supermajority to pass is also
likely to be more vigorous and informed than the debate over a typical stat-
ute, thereby providing further protection for individual rights. Second, a su-
permajority requirement indicates institutionally that the legislature holds
genuine respect for the Court's authority and judgment. The judiciary, as a
coordinate branch of government, is so worthy of deference that its rulings
can only be overturned by the explicit assent of a supermajority of the na-
tion's legislators. Though it may sound radical to an American observer,
then, a legislative override authorized by supermajority vote is actually "per-
fectly consistent with the constitutional theory of checks and balances," as it
would allow "Congress to override judicial vetoes by an extraordinary ma-
55 Throughout the article, I assume that it is Supreme Court decisions that will be overridden
by the legislature. But there is no reason why lower federal court decisions could not also be
overridden, assuming that the Supreme Court has chosen not to hear the case. Only the final
court decision for a given case, whatever the level of the court, should be subject to the over-
ride, so that the various stages of appeal may clarify and improve the judiciary's view of the
questioned law's constitutionality.
56 When Court decisions have a statutory basis, of course, the legislature can overrule them
through its normal lawmaking procedures; the legislative override is unnecessary.
57 Much more will be said about the advantages of the legislative override system in Part IlI.
I am more concerned here with laying out the various elements of the override system than
carefully defending them against all possible attacks.
HeinOnline  -- 10 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff.  264 2005
jority in the same way that it can override presidential vetoes. '58
It should be noted briefly that while the legislative override would sub-
stantially alter the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary
(compared to under U.S.-style judicial review), it would have little impact on
the executive branch's institutional role. The President would still be en-
trusted with executing the laws, supervising the administrative state, and tak-
ing the lead in foreign policy. The only difference would be that executive
actions held unconstitutional by the courts, like statutes, could be salvaged
by means of the legislative override. The President himself could not disre-
gard court rulings, but he could be authorized to do so by the legislature, in
accordance with the procedures outlined in this section.
2. No Preemptive Use of the Legislative Override
The legislature should be able to use the override only when the Court
has already found a law unconstitutional. In contrast to the Canadian and
Israeli models, the legislature should not be able to preemptively "bullet-
proof' statutes from constitutional challenge in the courts. Disallowing pre-
emptive overrides helps protect individual rights guarantees (and other con-
stitutional provisions) by giving the judiciary the initial opportunity to
present its judgment and defend its reasoning. Subsequent discussion of the
bill in question will inevitably be shaped by the Court opinion's language
and logic, and advocates of the override will need to engage and rebut the
Court's arguments. Permitting overrides to be exercised only in response to
a particular Court judgment will also improve the public debate over the
override's use. "The public will be aware, because of the judicial decision,
precisely of what will be lost or gained by invocation of the override. The
apathy which is bred by uncertainty and generality will be diminished." 59
3. Only Allow the Federal Legislature To Use the Override
The legislative override power should be reserved for the federal legis-
lature alone. Federal subunits, such as American states or Canadian prov-
inces, should not have the authority to set aside Supreme Court -rulings in-
58 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 176; see also Paul C. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democ-
racy: A New Canadian Version, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 84 (1984) ("Any measure that
could be navigated through all the branches of the national legislative process, each reflecting
a variety of constituencies and points of view, might well be considered a more sensible ap-
proach to the problem than would a verdict from a bare majority of five on the Court.").
59 Donna Greschner & Ken Norman, The Courts and Section 33, 12 QUEEN'S L.J. 155, 192
(1987).
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validating their laws. The first reason to deny federal subunits the override
power is because it is far more likely that a local majority (or supermajority)
will be inclined to infringe individual rights than a national majority. While
national majorities in favor of a given law typically reflect the input of many
different constituencies, with diverse priorities and interests, local majorities
can more easily emerge along pure ethnic, racial, or sectarian lines. As Paul
Weiler writes, "[flor many people, reflection on what might have happened
after Brown v. Board of Education had Mississippi had a legislative override
on [F]ourteenth [A]mendment issues is sobering enough to discredit the en-
tire notion [of subunit overrides]. 6° Second, allowing subunits to override
Supreme Court decisions is consistent with only quite extreme forms of fed-
eralism. 61 A subunit override provision implies that local political decisions
may trump national constitutional norms. Assuming a sufficiently motivated
local legislature, a subunit could entirely exempt itself from the values that
bind the rest of the country, thereby subverting the very notion of a unitary
state.62
4. Sunset Provision for Legislative Overrides
Legislative overrides, once passed by the federal legislature, should ex-
pire after a certain number of years (ideally spanning a national election), at
which point they could be renewed by a new supermajority vote.63 A sunset
provision of this sort is employed by both Canada and Israel, and serves two
of the values articulated above. First, it ensures that the national conversa-
60 Weiler, supra note 58, at 85. Weiler points out that Canadian provinces are also much
more likely to violate individual rights than the national Canadian government. French-
Catholics in Manitoba, Chinese in British Columbia, and English-speakers and Jehovah's
Witnesses in Quebec are just a few of the groups whose rights have been infringed by provin-
cial actions in the past. Id. at 85 n. 106.
61 Federalism is not one of the values that I argued is implicated by schemes of judicial re-
view. It was omitted because (1) unlike all the other values, it is not at all clear whether it is
better to have "more" or "less" federalism; and (2) whether subunits have the override power
is the only aspect of the legislative override debate that touches on federalism concerns.
62 The only reasons that I can see for giving the override power to federal subunits are if his-
torical experience creates confidence that the subunits are unlikely to wield the override
power egregiously, or if subunits demand the override power as a price for agreeing to the
constitution in the first place. Both of these arguments apply to the drafting of the Canadian
Charter.
63 Applying to legislative overrides Bruce Ackerman's idea of a "supermajoritarian escalator,"
by which states of emergency would require ever-larger legislative majorities at each vote to
be maintained, one can also imagine a system where the percentage of the vote required for
passage rises each time the legislative override is up for renewal. See Bruce Ackerman, The
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004).
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tion about constitutional interpretation will continue for years, as neither the
initial Court ruling nor the subsequent legislative override will mark the end
of the debate. Especially if an election is held between the use of the over-
ride and its subsequent expiration, the override will likely be a major cam-
paign issue, and legislators will have the benefit of the voters' input when
deciding whether to renew it. 64 Second, a sunset provision reduces the dan-
ger that the override poses for individual rights. An override passed in the
heat of a popular uproar over a controversial Court decision will expire a few
years down the road, along with its potentially rights-infringing elements,
unless a sober second look at the override confirms that it should be re-
newed. The nation's experience with the override in the period after its ex-
ercise will also guide legislators' votes on whether to renew it. If history
shows the Court's original reasoning to be prescient, legislators will be more
likely to allow the override to expire; conversely, if the Court's logic appears
as flawed years later as at the time of decision, legislators will probably re-
new the override.
Moreover, a sunset provision is in no way incompatible with the rule of
law. It is true that a sunset provision allows statutes to be passed by the leg-
islature, stricken by the Court, re-authorized by legislative override, and in-
validated anew once the designated number of years has elapsed. Statutes
may therefore transition into and out of legality several times in their life-
time. 65 But this possibility is not inconsistent with the rule of law since the
sunset provision's rules are known in advance by all parties. Laws are
stricken, renewed, and stricken once again in accordance with predetermined
procedures, making the sunset provision no different than the very similar
clauses that are frequently attached to ordinary legislation.66 A sunset provi-
sion does generate more flux in constitutional doctrine and statutes' applica-
bility-but clear ex ante procedures, not perfect legal stability, are the hall-
mark of the rule of law.
64 Pushing this point to its natural conclusion, Manfredi argues all legislative overrides should
expire at each national election. The newly elected legislators would then decide whether to
renew each override, or allow them to expire for good. MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 192.
65 Court decisions, similarly, may be initially binding (when they are issued), then of no pre-
cedential value (when they are overridden), then binding once again (when the override ex-
pires). This obviously creates some complications for the doctrine of stare decisis. But these
complications are unlikely to be too serious given that court rulings in systems without over-
rides are overruled without undermining the concept of legal precedent, and that lower courts
in an override system would likely wait until they knew the legislature's response to a contro-
versial high court decision before relying on that decision.
6 See, e.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (stating that various tax cuts will expire in 2010).
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5. Applicable to All Indeterminate Provisions of Constitution, Except
Those Dealing with Elections
Legislatures should be able to override Court rulings on the basis of all
constitutional clauses other than determinate provisions and provisions gov-
erning electoral processes. (By "determinate" provisions, I mean clauses
whose meaning cannot reasonably be disputed, such as "two Senators from
each State., 67 "Indeterminate" provisions, on the other hand, are clauses
about whose meaning reasonable people may disagree, such as "equal pro-
tection of the laws" 68 or "freedom of speech., 69) The purpose of the legisla-
tive override is to give the legislature a role in constitutional interpretation,
not to allow it to disregard clear constitutional dictates. No override should
be possible, then, vis-A-vis clauses whose meaning is undisputed, as any ex-
ercise of the override in this context would smack of extraconstitutionality.
It may, of course, be quite difficult in practice to distinguish between
determinate and indeterminate provisions. Opponents of a given use of the
override will likely argue that the constitutional provision at issue is deter-
minate (and correctly construed by the Court), while supporters of the over-
ride will contend that the provision is indeterminate. The solution to this di-
lemma is for the document that describes the override's characteristics-be
it the constitution itself, a constitutional amendment, or a simple statute-to
specify to which provisions the override applies. Canada and Israel both
employ a pre-commitment strategy of this sort,70 and have avoided any con-
troversy over when the override is available and when it is not.
A different logic explains why constitutional provisions regulating the
electoral process should be exempt from legislative override: the potential
for legislative self-dealing. If the legislature could disregard unfavorable
Court judgments on issues such as voting rights, electoral district-drawing,
and the timing of elections, a rogue legislature could subvert the democratic
process and entrench its power. Withdrawing constitutional clauses dealing
with the electoral process from the scope of the override power provides "in-
surance against the. .. possibility of a government's attempting to perpetuate
itself in [office] by denying basic rights of participation.",71
67 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
68 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
69 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
70 In Canada, the override may be used only to disregard Court decisions based on sections 2,
7-15 of the Charter, i.e. fundamental freedoms, legal rights, and equality rights. See supra
notes 11-12. In Israel, the override only applies to Court decisions based on the freedom of
occupation. See supra note 43.
71 Weiler, supra note 58, at 82.
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6. Requirement of Explicit "Notwithstanding" Language
Unlike in Canada and Israel, all uses of the legislative override should
explicitly refer to the Court ruling that they are setting aside as well as the
constitutional clauses invoked in the ruling72 (e.g. "notwithstanding the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez,73 interpreting Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution,7 4 the United States Congress passes the Gun-
Free School Zones Act"). This strict wording requirement makes very clear
what the stakes are when use of the override is being considered, inevitably
"draw[ing] the proposal to the attention of the opposition, the press, and the
general public. 75 Public discourse when an override has been proposed is
likely to be quite vigorous, and infused with deep questions about the mean-
ing and popular understanding of the constitution. In this atmosphere of
heightened scrutiny, the likelihood that fundamental rights will be violated
by the legislature is reduced, since the political costs of exercising the over-
ride without broad public support are magnified by the debate's high profile.
C. The Override's Place in the Literature
The legislative override model introduced above is not, of course, the
first effort to resolve what Alexander Bickel famously described as the
"countermajoritarian difficulty" with judicial review. 76 Many scholars have
written about judicial review, arguing that it should be maintained in its clas-
sic U.S. format, that it should be modified somewhat, or that it should be
abolished altogether. This article's proposal, though, differs in important re-
spects from the major academic perspectives on judicial review, and de-
scribes a middle ground between judicial supremacy and parliamentary sov-
ereignty that is all too often ignored in the literature.
One prominent school of thought argues that there is nothing wrong
with U.S.-style judicial supremacy. According to proponents such as Ronald
Dworkin, Laurence Tribe, and Owen Fiss, judges are uniquely positioned, by
72 I do not believe that the override wording should state that the law is passed notwithstand-
ing the relevant constitutional clause itself. As mentioned above, I am defending the legisla-
tive override as a means for involving the legislature in constitutional interpretation and en-
forcement, not as a way for it to ignore what it actually believes to be the constitution's
dictates.
73 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 ("The Congress shall have power ... to regulate Commerce.
. among the several States.").
75 Weiler, supra note 58, at 81.
76 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962).
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virtue of their training and independence, to reflect on and decide constitu-
tional questions.7' Legislatures, in contrast, "see their primary function in
terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the people," and are
"not ideologically committed or institutionally suited to search for the mean-
ing of constitutional values., 78 Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional
moments, similarly, finds judicial review unproblematic because "courts
serve democracy by protecting the hard-won judgments of a mobilized citi-
zenry against fundamental change by political elites., 79 This article's pro-
posal clearly clashes with the views of Dworkin, Tribe, and Fiss, which pro-
tect rights and reasoned discourse only by sacrificing an inordinate degree of
democratic decision-making. Ackerman's theory also fails to save judicial
review from the charge that it is undemocratic, since the legislature typically
seeks not to undo a historic constitutional moment, but merely to express its
disagreement with the courts about what that moment meant.
A second school of thought takes the opposite position, that courts' very
power to strike unconstitutional laws should be eliminated. Robert Bork has
called for the abolition of judicial review because, "as our institutional ar-
rangements now stand, the Court can never be made a legitimate element of
a basically democratic polity. '80 Despite holding very different political
views, Mark Tushnet has echoed Bork's recommendation while arguing that
eliminating judicial review would result in the development of a "vibrant
populist constitutional law."81 This article's proposal also obviously clashes
with this position, which upholds majoritarian expression above all other
values, and would drastically reduce the protection afforded to fundamental
rights.
Third, and most interesting for the purposes of this article, several schol-
ars have attempted to soften the undemocratic edges of judicial review with-
out abandoning the basic parameters of the American model. Bickel argued
77 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (2d ed. 1988); Ronald
Dworkin, Constitutionalism and Democracy, 3 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 11 (1995); Owen M. Fiss, The
Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979). For
a ringing affirmation by the Court of its own supremacy, see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18
(1958) (Marbury "declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the ex-
position of the law of the Constitution," and this idea "has ever since been respected by this
Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional sys-
tem.").
78 Fiss, supra note 77, at 10.
79 Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 465 (1989)
(emphasis added); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
80 Robert Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996, at 21, 23.
81 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 177 (1999).
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that judges should exercise the "passive virtues" by using procedural tech-
niques (e.g. standing, ripeness, the discretionary certiorari power, etc.) to
avoid answering constitutional questions. The "legislative constitutional-
ism" model advanced by writers such as Robert Post, Reva Siegel, Keith
Whittington, and Larry Kramer encourages courts to show more deference
toward the legislature's constitutional judgments, in particular when the leg-
islature employs its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power to remedy
constitutional violations. 83 And Judge Guido Calabresi has called on courts
to avoid conventional "Type I" judicial review, and to strike laws primarily
when they violate the antidiscrimination principle ("Type II" review) or are
the product of undue legislative haste or subterfuge ("Type III" review).84
The fundamental problem with these approaches is that they do not go
far enough. All of them would reduce judicial arbitrariness and improve
democratic accountability compared to a system of pure judicial supremacy,
but the balance they would strike between protecting fundamental rights and
promoting democratic decision-making is still far from satisfactory. When
judges operating under Bickel's framework decide that it is time for action
rather than passivity, it is little consolation to the legislature whose laws are
stricken that the courts were patient before exercising their authority. Simi-
larly, the formal structure and power relations of the legislative constitution-
alism system are identical to the institutional status quo. Courts might be
more deferential toward certain legislative interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, but they would still retain the unchallenged authority to strike statutes
that go too far. As Post and Siegel write, "extrajudicial constitutional inter-
pretation [would] co-exist with judicial review."8 Moreover, the legislative
constitutionalism model (at least in Post and Siegel's formulation) extends
only to congressional use of the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
82 BICKEL, supra note 76, at 111-99.
83 See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (2001); Robert E. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section
Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J.
1943 (2003); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objec-
tions and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REv. 773 (2002).
84 Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court 1990 Term Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Consti-
tutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REv. 80
(1991).
85 Post & Siegel, supra note 83, at 2028; see also Kramer, supra note 83, at 7-8 (The advo-
cates of legislative constitutionalism "all ultimately accept some version of judicial su-
premacy," proposing systems where "[tlhe political branches are permitted, in effect, to
behave like naughty lower courts, free to ignore the spirit though not the letter of judicial
precedent.").
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In every other context-in particular, when the dispute is whether a statute
infringes protected rights rather than whether Congress has the authority to
pass the statute--courts would need to show no particular deference toward
the legislature's judgment. Finally, Calabresi makes clear that he would not
eliminate Type I judicial review entirely,86 and provides the legislature with
no recourse when its statutes are stricken (with the limited exception that the
procedural defects of statutes invalidated pursuant to Type III review could
be remedied). In contrast to this article's proposal, Bickel, Post, Siegel,
Calabresi, et al. take for granted the formal characteristics of American judi-
cial review, and their theories accordingly are unable to transcend the
American model's limitations.
Ill.THE LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE SYSTEM VERSUS ITS RIVALS
Parts I and II above described the Canadian and Israeli experiences
with the legislative override and introduced what I consider to be the optimal
arrangement of judicial review. But there has been no systematic compari-
son yet between the override and other judicial review systems. This Part
provides that comparative analysis, first in terms of the values secured by
different schemes of judicial review, and second in terms of the incentives
that different arrangements generate for courts, legislatures, and the public.
After comparing the legislative override system to its most prominent rivals,
I return to the Canadian and Israeli experiences and explain how they might
have been improved under the arrangement proposed in Part II.
Rather than compare the override to its rivals in the abstract, this Part's
first two sections invoke the hypothetical statutes mentioned at the beginning
of the article. I assume that both the National Security Act and the Better
Neighbors Act would be found unconstitutional by American courts.87 I also
treat the two statutes as archetypes, respectively, of "bad" and "good" un-
constitutional legislation: that is, legislation that blatantly violates funda-
mental rights, and legislation backed by strong policy arguments whose con-
stitutionality is a close call. The National Security Act is similar to the
World War I-era Espionage Act, to President Roosevelt's executive order
that resulted in the confinement of a hundred thousand Japanese-Americans
during World War II, and to some of the more extreme government policies
86 See Calabresi, supra note 84, at 135 ("[T]here does exist in our polity a degree of consen-
sus over the propriety of Type I protection for certain categories of rights.... To treat
even these rights as subject to legislative reconsideration inevitably and unintentionally
begins an erosion of these rights that is neither justified nor desirable.").
87 See supra notes 1-3.
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enacted during the ongoing war on terror.88 Many of our courts' proudest
moments have come when they condemned such actions,89 and many of their
darkest when they failed to intercede. 90 The Better Neighbors Act, on the
other hand, resembles the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence
Against Women Act, laws that were passed by wide margins, that threatened
no fundamental rights, and that were stricken by a divided Court in highly
controversial decisions. 91 History has not redeemed the Court's decisions in
Lopez and Morrison; indeed, the view in much of the academy is that those
cases "resurrect the mindless formalism of the Lochner Court.,
92
A. Values Realized
How do the values attained by the legislative override model compare to
those attained by other judicial review systems? What values are served by
enabling the legislature to override the Court's rulings that the National Se-
curity Act and Better Neighbors Act are unconstitutional, as opposed to
treating the Court's rulings as final, or not allowing judicial review in the
first place?
Comparing the override first to U.S.-style judicial supremacy, it is true
that the former will likely be somewhat worse at protecting fundamental
rights, because of the lower barriers to egregious legislative (and executive)
behavior that it implies. The legislature will always have the formal power
to disregard Court rulings and re-pass troubling statutes like the National Se-
curity Act. There are several reasons, though, why the risk of legislative tyr-
anny under the override system is not nearly as high as some critics allege.
93
88 For example, the government's attempt to detain alleged enemy combatants until the end of
hostilities after providing just "some evidence" of their belligerent status. The Court rejected
this attempt in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, (2004).
89 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
90 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214; Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616.
91 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
92 Tom Stacy, What's Wrong with Lopez, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 243, 244 (1996).
93 See, e.g., JONATHAN BLACK-BRANCH, RIGHTS AND REALITIES: THE JUDICIAL IMPACT OF THE
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ON EDUCATION, CASE LAW, AND POLITICAL
JURISPRUDENCE 29 (1997) ("[A] legislature could deny individual freedoms to meet certain
ends, such as social, linguistic, or political agendas."); Reginald A. Whitaker, Democracy and
the Canadian Constitution, in AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
CONSTITUTION ACT 240, 257 (Keith Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1983) ("Even if [the leg-
islative override] is sparingly employed, it constitutes a kind of potential constitutional denial
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First, the system's many built-in structural safeguards-the supermajority
requirement, the ban on preemptive override use, the reservation of the over-
ride power to the federal legislature alone, the sunset provision, and the
mandatory "notwithstanding" language-radically reduce the likelihood of
the legislature violating civil liberties. To permanently set aside the Court's
invalidation of the National Security Act, for instance, a federal legislative
supermajority would need to be assembled, the override would need to be
explicitly and publicly employed, and the whole process would need to be
repeated a few years later when the override expired. Given that courts
rarely deviate too far from majority opinion, 94 any context in which the over-
ride's built-in safeguards fail to thwart egregious legislative behavior is
likely to be a context in which the courts would not have invalidated the of-
fensive behavior in the first place.95
Second, the only situations where the legislative override is likely to be
used (assuming legislative good faith) are those in which the Court has ad-
vanced a controversial and deeply unpopular interpretation of a certain con-
of individual rights."). Of course, these criticisms were leveled at the Canadian override,
which lacks many of the safeguards of this Article's proposal.
94 See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 192 (1989)
("Overall, the evidence suggests that the modem Court has been an essentially majoritarian
institution. Where clear poll margins exist, three-fifths to two-thirds of Court rulings reflect
the polls."); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Counterma-
joritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 87, 97 (1993) ("[F]or most of the period since 1956, the Court has been highly
responsive to majority opinion.").
95 See MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 189 ("[T]he corruption of any state" where legislative tyr-
anny ensued under the override system "would be so complete as to permeate every institu-
tion, including the courts."). An argument can be made that an arrangement of U.S.-style ju-
dicial review would be less susceptible to this kind of systemic corruption than the legislative
override system. Because a political majority in the U.S. requires many years to fill the courts
with its appointees, there would need to be an extended period of corrupt intolerant govern-
ment before the judiciary could be made to abandon its historical commitment to protecting
individual rights. In a legislative override system, in contrast, a corrupt intolerant majority
could immediately start overriding Supreme Court decisions. There are several problems
with this argument. First, judges in a legislative override system can also have life tenure,
meaning that it would take an ill-intentioned majority just as long to seize control of the
courts in one system as in the other. Second, while a legislative majority in an override sys-
tem can immediately set aside Supreme Court decisions, the process of doing so is intention-
ally difficult, and subject to built-in correction through the sunset provision. Third, it may
actually be better for a country's long-term constitutional health if a corrupt majority over-
rides a "good" Court decision, thereby incurring widespread condemnation and eventual re-
versal through the sunset provision, than if Court decisions are always set in stone and unas-
sailable through regular legislative means.
HeinOnline  -- 10 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff.  274 2005
The Case for the Legislative Override
stitutional provision. An override under these circumstances-one resusci-
tating the stricken Better Neighbors Act, for example-does not constitute a
clear constitutional violation, but rather a clash between two "different po-
litical conceptions [of the constitution] contending with one another," 96 in
which it is not at all clear why the side of the courts should prevail. 97 The ju-
dicial position on the provisions in question may be more accurate doctri-
nally, but the legislative interpretation will often be a truer reflection of the
public's evolving constitutional understanding.
Third, the inter-branch discourse and public debate fostered by the legis-
lative override may result in a more nuanced explication of constitutional
provisions than judicial decision-making alone can produce. As Walter Tar-
nopolsky writes, "civil liberties are best protected if the issues are clarified in
a kind of public dialogue between the legislative and judicial branches of
government . . .because public and institutional deliberation promotes
deeper knowledge and appreciation of individual rights."98 In the case of the
Better Neighbors Act, the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment en-
forcement power will be better debated and understood if Congress and the
public are active participants in constitutional interpretation rather than a
passive audience to the Court's pronouncements.
The legislative override model will also probably possess slightly99 less
stability and predictability of constitutional norms than U.S.-style judicial
review. Both actual use of the override, and the knowledge that it exists as
an available legislative tool, are likely to heighten the volatility of constitu-
tional doctrine. In contrast to its minor concessions in the areas of individual
rights and legal stability, however, the legislative override system will likely
perform far better in promoting democratic decision-making, more construc-
tive inter-branch relations, and richer public discourse. The very existence
of an override means that Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty largely dis-
96 MANDEL, supra note 20, at 79.
97 See also HIEBERT, supra note 49, at 54 ("[The legislature's disagreements with the Court]
are not from a lack of respect for rights but from its different judgment about the priority that
should be accorded to the conflicting rights and values at issue."); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Judi-
cial Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 451,452 (2003)
("[The legislative override's] real purpose is to enable legislatures to override judicial inter-
pretations or applications of [constitutional] rights with which they reasonably disagree.").
98 Walter S. Tarnopolsky, The Constitution and Human Rights, in AND No ONE CHEERED:
FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT 261, 271 (Keith Banting & Richard
Simeon eds., 1983).
99 Only slightly less, because (1) the legislative override is likely to be used only rarely; and
(2) as discussed below, courts may temper their more activist-and hence unpredictable-
rulings when faced with the possibility of their judgments being set aside.
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appears, as the public and their elected representatives are provided. with the
means to express themselves when they disagree with the Court on constitu-
tional issues. The Court's invalidation of a law such as the Better Neighbors
Act is not the end of the discussion, but rather a cue for the next line of con-
stitutional dialogue.
Much of the rancor that final judicial authority engenders in the democ-
ratic branches of government would also vanish under a legislative override
system, since actions of the legislature and the executive deemed unconstitu-
tional by the Court would no longer automatically be thwarted. 10 Congress
would not have to return to the drawing board in frustration after the Better
Neighbors Act is stricken, but could re-pass the law over the courts' objec-
tions.101 Finally, features of the override such as its "notwithstanding" lan-
guage, its expiration after a set time period, and its usage only in the after-
math of a Court decision ensure that constitutional discussion would be far
more extensive and meaningful than in contemporary American society. In-
stead of being choked off by an authoritative Court ruling, the public debate
about the constitutionality of the National Security Act or Better Neighbors
Act would continue as the legislature considered use of the override, and
later as it mulled renewing the override or allowing it to expire.
The advantages of the legislative override system are even clearer when
it is compared to traditional British parliamentary sovereignty. First, funda-
mental rights are obviously better safeguarded, ceteris paribus, under a sys-
tem with a written constitution and with judicial authority to strike laws
deemed incompatible with the constitution. Even if rulings by the Court can
be overturned in exceptional cases by a legislative supermajority, civil liber-
ties are still afforded far more protection than in a regime where judicial rul-
ings of unconstitutionality cannot be made in the first place. Under a regime
of pure parliamentary sovereignty, for instance, the National Security Act
would be immune from any judicial scrutiny at all. Second, a parliamentary
system does, by definition, result in more majoritarianism than a legislative
override system (or any other constitutional system). But it does so in the
areas where we are most suspicious of majority rule-that is, in situations
where the legislature is tempted for political reasons to infringe individual
rights, but is prevented from doing so by the intentionally unwieldy provi-
sions built into the override instrument. The National Security Act would be
10o The courts might be irritated at their relative loss of power, but this temporary irritation is
a small price to pay for a judiciary that more explicitly takes into account the legislative and
public understanding of the constitution.
101 The same is true, of course, of the National Security Act. But, as argued above, it is my
view that the override would probably not be employed to rescue the National Security Act.
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good law in a parliamentary system, but this is not an outcome that we
should embrace given the statute's negative consequences for civil liberties.
Third, relations between the judiciary and the legislature are likely to be
far more constructive when neither branch is obviously predominant over the
other, as opposed to when courts confront an unassailable and incontroverti-
ble legislative power. Courts' ability to strike laws like the National Secu-
rity Act or Better Neighbors Act under the override system forces the legis-
lature to take the judiciary's views into account, even if it is ultimately free
to disregard them. Fourth, the stability and predictability of law must be
greater when legal debates are tethered by a constitutional text rather than
subjected to the changing whims of Parliament. The existence of the over-
ride allows more legal flux than U.S.-style judicial review, but far less than
parliamentarism. Finally, public discourse under a regime of parliamentary
sovereignty avoids the debilitating effects of judicial supremacy-but only
by forsaking the deliberative benefits implicit in a written constitution that
articulates a nation's deepest civic values. Majorities are never frustrated by
having courts nullify laws that they support, but they also have difficulty
viewing legislative debates through any prism other than prudentialism.
As for the modern United Kingdom and New Zealand systems of horta-
tory judicial review (in which the Court can declare a law to be incompatible
with the European Convention or Bill of Rights, but cannot actually strike
it), they still fail to protect individual rights sufficiently. Because "those
who want Parliament to accept a judicial declaration of incompatibility bear
the burden of legislative inertia, ' 0 2 it is substantially more difficult for con-
stitutionally questionable laws to be revised or rescinded under a system of
hortatory judicial review than under the legislative override. Judicial pro-
nouncements that the National Security Act or Better Neighbors Act are in-
compatible with the European Convention or Bill of Rights, for example,
would have no effect unless they prodded the legislature into revising the
statutes. The modern British and New Zealand approaches do offer more as-
surances that rights will not be violated than traditional parliamentary sover-
eignty, and also improve public deliberation and inter-branch relations by
initiating a constitutional dialogue between the legislatures and the courts.
But, in all these respects, they still lag behind the legislative override system,
which more jealously guards civil liberties, and establishes the institutional
conditions for a richer and more enduring debate. Hortatory judicial review
may be preferable to pure parliamentary sovereignty, but there seems to be
no good reason to adopt it over the more robust legislative override model.
102 Perry, supra note 4, at 670.
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B. Institutional Incentives Under the Override
The discussion to this point has hinted at, but not made explicit, the in-
centives that the Court, legislature, and public would face under the legisla-
tive override system at different points in the political process. Here, I out-
line the motivations that would likely drive judicial, legislative, and popular
behavior under a legislative override, thereby lending further support to this
article's claims about the override's merits. 0 3 Because U.S.-style judicial re-
view is in my view the most important rival of the legislative override sys-
tern, I also discuss the incentives that it generates.' °4 This section takes for
granted Eskridge and Frickey's contention that "each branch.., acts strate-
gically, calibrating its actions in anticipation of how other institutions [will]
respond." 1
0 5
1. TI: The Drafting and Passage of a Law That Raises Constitutional
Questions
Under the familiar American system, Congress cannot just pass what-
ever law it thinks is best. Whenever a bill touches on a constitutionally sen-
sitive area-e.g. free speech, religion, criminal procedure, Commerce Clause
authority, to name just a few-Congress must anticipate court objections,
and tailor the bill so as to avoid them to the greatest extent possible. 106 There
comes a point, presumably, at which the additional legislative effort required
103 This discussion of incentives generated inevitably overlaps with the earlier analysis of the
values secured by the override system compared to U.S.-style judicial review. I have tried to
keep redundancy to a minimum.
104 On the other hand, I do not explicitly discuss the incentives produced by pure parliamen-
tary sovereignty or hortatory judicial review. The incentives under pure parliamentary sover-
eignty are relatively obvious-and not very relevant to a discussion that presumes a written
constitution-while the incentives under hortatory judicial review are similar to those under
the legislative override, but muted because of the courts' merely advisory power.
105 William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term Foreword: Law
as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26, 29 (1994).
106 Cf Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boeme v.
Flores, 111 HARv. L. REv. 153, 160 (1997) (observing that both houses of Congress held
hearings on the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). I am assuming
here that Congress is interested, at least to some degree, in actually enacting policies that it
considers to be prudent. Obviously, if legislators are solely concerned about winning political
points, they will show little interest in trifling issues like whether the bills they pass are con-
stitutional. Even under a wholly cynical view of lawmaking, however, politicians would need
to pay some attention to the constitutionality of bills because constitutional arguments are an
important part of the public debate on many issues, and may therefore have an impact on poli-
ticians' electoral fates.
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to shield a bill from constitutional challenge outweighs the potential benefit,
as measured by the incremental reduction in the probability of the law being
nullified. Still, Congress must spend significant time and effort considering
the constitutionality of a bill's provisions, as likely to be evaluated by con-
temporaneous and future courts, instead of the bill's actual merits. This
characteristic of congressional legislating produces all sorts of perverse in-
centives. "Too many constitutional norms [are injected] into the lawmaking
process,"'' 0 7 and legislators (and the public) become either "disillusioned
with the procedures of representative government,"' 08 or preemptively angry
at the courts that are expected to prevent the majority's wishes from being
realized. I have assumed so far that the Better Neighbors Act was actually
passed by Congress. But as this discussion illustrates, it is quite possible
that the judiciary's expected response to the statute would either prevent it
from ever being enacted, or force Congress to substantially amend it so that
it complies with the courts' constitutional interpretation.
Under an override system, in contrast, the legislature need not agonize
to the same extent over a bill's constitutionality in the eyes of the judiciary.
Since the Court's say is not necessarily final, the legislature can more expe-
ditiously pass laws like the Better Neighbors Act even though it is aware that
those laws might be found unconstitutional. For two reasons, though, the
legislative override system should not cause the legislature casually or fre-
quently to pass constitutionally questionable bills. First, the intentional
cumbersomeness of the override process means that a legislative majority
can rarely anticipate with much certainty that it will be able to muster the
necessary votes to use the override in the future. Because of this uncertainty,
the legislature will still try to pass bills that present as few constitutional dif-
ficulties to the judiciary as possible, so as to minimize the likelihood of the
Court striking a law and the legislature then being unable to override this rul-
ing-which is the worst possible outcome for the legislature. The constitu-
tionally questionable laws that the legislature passes will therefore resemble
the Better Neighbors Act more than the National Security Act, since the lat-
ter statute's constitutional flaws are more glaring, and overriding a Court rul-
ing striking it would be more difficult.
Second, as long as a country's constitution is viewed as legitimate, leg-
islators concerned about reelection will respect-or, at least, seek to appear
to respect-its provisions. The "political accountability of the [legislature's]
members ensures . .. that they take due care in developing and applying
107 Tushnet, supra note 52, at 247.
108 Peter H. Russell, The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian
Courts, 25 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 15, 32 (1982).
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[constitutional] standards," 10 9 and that they do not pass laws to which the
public may object precisely because of their dubious constitutionality. In
particular, rights-infringing statutes like the National Security Act would
face great hurdles in being enacted, under both U.S.-style judicial review and
the override system, since perceived incompatibility with the constitution
carries negative political consequences. The only situation, then, when a
legislature under the override system is likely to pass laws that it believes the
courts may nullify is when it regards these laws as deeply important and
necessary, and consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the constitution.
2. T2: The Supreme Court's Decision Whether To Strike a Federal Law
Once a constitutionally questionable bill has become law in the U.S.,
and a case testing its constitutionality has been decided by a circuit court, the
Supreme Court has two decisions to make: whether to grant certiorari; and, if
it grants cert, how to decide the case. Under the American model of judicial
review, the Court is relatively unconstrained in making these choices. For
the most part, it alone determines which cases it will hear. And the Justices
are free to decide cases on the basis of political ideology, jurisprudential phi-
losophy, partisan allegiance, policy preferences, the relevant case law, or any
other factor. To be sure, there are some constraints on what the Court can
do, since decisions that are out of step with popular opinion may provoke re-
sistance or disobedience by other political actors, and erode the Court's au-
thority and credibility. Fear of losing legitimacy may therefore cause the
Court not to accept for review some cases in which it is interested, to reduce
the scope of some rulings, and perhaps even to decide some cases differ-
ently. Generally speaking, though, the Court is accountable in the short term
to no one but itself. It may strike the Better Neighbors Act even though it
knows the law is wildly popular.
Under a legislative override system, on the other hand, the Court is ac-
countable for its decisions, since the legislature possesses the explicit power
to pass laws "notwithstanding" the Court's rulings. The Court's dominant
incentive within this arrangement is to avoid having its judgments overrid-
den by the legislature, as overrides diminish the Court's authority and result
in its least desired legal outcomes coming about. This incentive should
cause the Court to change its behavior in two important (and largely posi-
tive) ways. First, it will be forced to consider more carefully the likely legis-
lative and public response to any decision that it makes to strike a law as un-
109 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 13-14 (1996).
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constitutional. " 0 To prevent its rulings from being overridden, the Court will
endeavor to issue judgments that most people support--or, at least, that a
supermajority of legislators do not oppose. This greater attention to legisla-
tive and public opinion suggests that so-called "activist" judgments, where
the Court deviates substantially from the norms and policies that society is
prepared to accept, will decrease in frequency. Instead, an "environment in
which the Court ha[s] to incorporate calculations about likely legislative re-
sponses to its judgments . . . encourage[s] strategic moderation of judicial
review." 1 ' The Court will be less likely to invalidate the well-liked Better
Neighbors Act, while, depending on the National Security Act's popularity,
probably still willing to strike that statute.' 
1 2
Second, regardless of the substance of a decision, the Court will seek to
make its opinions as persuasive as possible to the legislature and the public.
Knowing that its opinions will be read and evaluated not just by lower courts
and academics, but also by legislators, pundits, and concerned citizens debat-
ing whether to use the override, the Court is likely to de-emphasize dry legal
doctrine, and phrase its opinions in resonant language intended to appeal to
ordinary people. A decision striking the Better Neighbors Act could not rely
on arid formalism, but would have to speak in the practical vocabulary that
comes naturally to citizens and legislators. Court incentives under the over-
ride system would therefore tend to create a jurisprudence of lower stakes
and greater eloquence.
110 Some commentators argue that the reverse is more likely to be the case, i.e. that the over-
ride will encourage the Court to issue bolder rulings, secure in the knowledge that legislators
will be able to override decisions that they perceive as too unpopular or controversial. See,
e.g., Weiler, supra note 58, at 80 n.98 ("To my mind, a major virtue of the [legislative over-
ride is] that it could elicit more vigorous judicial scrutiny of a broad range of civil rights is-
sues, because it would give our judges a sense of security from the presence of a legislative
safety net beneath them."). This argument has been proven wrong empirically, as the Cana-
dian courts were more restrained when the legislative override was considered a legitimate
option, and have grown bolder as the override has become more of a dead letter. The claim is
also implausible, as it assumes an irrational nonchalance about being overridden on the part of
the courts.
1 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 188.
112 If we assume that the National Security Act is also very popular, and that there is a high
institutional price to be paid for striking it, then it is unlikely that courts under any system
would invalidate it. The U.S. Supreme Court, notably, failed to invalidate either the Espio-
nage Act or the World War I internment of Japanese-Americans, even though there was no
possibility that it could be overridden.
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3. T3: The Legislature's Decision on Whether To Use the Override
In the U.S., the formal political process is essentially over once the Su-
preme Court nullifies a federal law. Legislators may complain furiously
about the Court's decision, turn its "activism" into a campaign issue, and try
to pass similar laws that avoid the constitutional pitfalls that led to the first
statute's demise. But, barring a constitutional amendment,' 13 the original
law cannot be rescued. The debate over the Court's decision may rage for a
time, but it is likely to be a very frustrating discussion, full of anger but help-
less to ameliorate the situation. President Clinton, for example, declared that
he was "terribly disappointed" by the invalidation of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, but did not question the Court's authority to rule as it did. 1
4
The great appeal of the legislative override system is that the Court's
ruling no longer represents the end of the political process. Confronted with
a Court decision striking one of its laws, the legislature has the authority to
pass the stricken law anew, now immunized from constitutional challenge
for a number of years. The legislature's incentive to use the override will be
strongest when a Court ruling has incited broad and deep popular opposition,
and when the Court itself was fractured in reaching its decision. Under these
circumstances, legislators will be able to profit politically from invoking the
override, and the Court's divisions will lessen the potential negative conse-
quences of disagreeing with the judiciary about the constitution's mean-
ing." 5 Judicial invalidation of the Better Neighbors Act is a paradigmatic
example of such a situation (assuming the Court is as divided as it was in
Lopez and Morrison).
There are, however, several reasons why situations like the striking of
the Better Neighbors Act will seldom arise, and why the override will proba-
bly be exercised only rarely. First, a politically savvy Court, aware that the
113 Even if it were easier to pass constitutional amendments in the U.S., it does not follow that
Supreme Court decisions opposed by the legislature, mostly involving policy matters, should
be addressed by changes in the nation's constitutive text. See MANFREDI, supra note 15, at
171 ("[T]o rely on a process this cumbersome as the primary response to Supreme Court...
decisions is questionable when most of those decisions involve policy-oriented disputes...
.11).
114 See Ann Devroy & Al Kamen, Clinton Says Gun Ruling Is a Threat, WASH. POST, Apr. 30,
1995, at Al. Congress did pass a revised version of the statute, applicable only to guns that
have traveled in interstate commerce. That statute's constitutionality has not been adjudi-
cated.
115 It is also possible that the legislature would often use the override in response to highly
technical Court decisions that create little public interest. I doubt this would be the case be-
cause most constitutional questions are of broad interest, and because the mention alone of
using the override is likely to produce widespread media attention.
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legislature has the power to set aside its decisions, is unlikely to frequently
issue rulings that create widespread antagonism. The Court will pick its bat-
tles carefully, handing down judgments that it expects the legislature to op-
pose only when it is confident of public support. The Court in an override
system would probably choose not to invalidate the Better Neighbors Act,
and if it struck the National Security Act it would do so in language calcu-
lated to maximize public backing for its action. Second, regardless of the
direction of the Court's rulings, legislators will be reluctant, in most circum-
stances, to directly challenge the Court's moral authority on issues of rights
and constitutional interpretation. As Jeffrey Goldsworthy writes, "the most
likely reason for legislators not using the override is that the electorate is
unlikely to trust their judgment about constitutional rights more than the
judges' judgment."' 16 Legislative reluctance to confront the Court will be
highest in situations like the invalidation of the National Security Act, where
the Court portrays itself as the guardian of civil liberties and accuses the leg-
islature of tyrannical inclinations.
Third, the legislative majority that produced the stricken law is more
likely to weaken in the face of an adverse Court decision than to intensify
into the required supermajority."l7 The political landscape may have changed
since the law was originally passed; some legislators may be convinced by
the Court ruling not to renew their support for the law; initial opponents of
the law will see their position strengthened by the Court's endorsement of
their position; and the Court itself may tailor its decision by preserving
popular provisions of the statute and striking only selected objectionable
portions. These factors are all magnified in the case of a law, like the Na-
tional Security Act, that was likely passed with some queasiness by the leg-
islature. Finally, several features of the legislative override make it difficult
for the legislature to deploy in any but the most egregious circumstances: the
requirement of including explicit "notwithstanding" language, the need to
assemble a legislative supermajority, the impossibility of preemptively "bul-
letproofing" legislation, and the sunset provision. For these reasons, the leg-
islature's incentive to use the override will generally be weak, and will likely
only be heightened on those rare occasions when there is a public consensus
that the Court has erred or overreached, and needs to be pulled back towards
the public's contrasting constitutional understanding.
116 Goldsworthy, supra note 97, at 456.
117 See Mark Tushnet, Judicial Activism or Restraint in a Section 33 World, 53 U. OF
TORONTO L.J. 89, 96-97 (2003) ([Even with a legislative override,] minority faction[s] within
the ruling party can exercise the kind of veto [over override use] that a president can in a
separation of powers system.").
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4. T4: The Legislature's Decision on Whether To Renew the Override
Once the legislature has overridden a Court judgment, the resuscitated
law's story is still not over. Under the institutional arrangement that I am
defending, the legislature must decide after some specified time period
whether to renew the override or not. When the legislature faces this deci-
sion, the heated emotions that may have characterized the initial override
debate will probably have subsided. Critics of the Court's ruling, after all,
will have succeeded in reversing its holding through legislative means, and
will have had little reason to maintain their mobilization indefinitely. In this
less polarized, more discreet environment, the political stakes for legislators
should be lower, and they should be able to evaluate the question of override
renewal more strictly on its merits. If the law sustained by the override has
performed poorly and engendered continuing criticism from judges, academ-
ics, and other commentators, legislators may refuse to re-authorize the over-
ride without paying the political price that this stance would have cost them
initially. Legislators may have been pressured to use the override to resusci-
tate the National Security Act, for instance, but these stresses would be di-
minished when the override came up for renewal. On the other hand, if the
passage of time shows that it was the judiciary that overreacted in striking
the statute, and that the law has functioned without damaging the country's
constitutional culture, legislators will probably quickly vote to renew the
override.1 1 8 1 would expect this to be the case with an override that salvaged
the Better Neighbors Act. In essence, the override's sunset provision gives
the legislature an opportunity to re-evaluate its choices with the benefit of
hindsight, and to get things right the second (or third, or fourth) time around.
C. Canada Revisited
The two sections above compared the legislative override system to
U.S.-style judicial review, traditional British parliamentary sovereignty, and
the modern British and New Zealand regime of hortatory judicial review.
They did not, however, appraise this article's proposed system against the
actual Canadian and Israeli models. This section and the one that follows
evaluate in some detail the Canadian and Israeli experiences with the legisla-
118 Two interesting questions are whether there should be any restriction on the number of
times an override can be renewed, or conversely if an override should no longer need to be
renewed after a certain number of votes in its favor. I would answer both questions in the
negative. Overrides should be renewable as long as a legislative supermajority continues to
support them, but respect for the judiciary and its primary role in constitutional interpretation
demands that override renewal always be deliberate rather than automatic.
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tive override, and show how they might have been improved under this arti-
cle's proposed arrangement.
Beginning with Canada, there seems to be a general consensus outside
Quebec that the override is barely legitimate because it provides insufficient
protection for individual rights. Academics may rave that "the override
gives Canada an opportunity to get the best out of British and American con-
stitutionalisn," 9 but politicians and other commentators are far harsher in
their judgments. As mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Mulroney attacked
the override as the "fatal flaw" of the Charter after it was used by Quebec in
the context of language rights. 20 Prominent New Democratic Party MP
Svend Robinson called for Parliament to "delete this section, which so effec-
tively guts the provisions of the Charter.' 21 Well-respected lawyers such as
Edward Greenspan argued that "the whole object of a charter is to say, you
never opt out, they're inalienable rights,' ' 122 and the Canadian Bar Associa-
tion's "official position since entrenchment has been unwavering opposi-
tion" to the legislative override."'
123
In my view, the override's record vis-A-vis the protection of fundamen-
tal liberties is actually more positive than its critics' rhetoric would suggest.
It has only been used on a handful of major occasions, indicating that there is
certainly no widespread practice of Canadian legislatures blithely violating
Charter-guaranteed rights for momentary political advantage. The override
has also usually been exercised preemptively, meaning that there was gener-
ally no definitive judicial judgment about individual rights that the legisla-
ture was disregarding. In at least one case (Saskatchewan), a later Supreme
Court ruling 24 determined that the law shielded by the override was not un-
constitutional in the first place, which "meant that the use of the [notwith-
standing clause] was unnecessary," and a fortiori not a subversion of consti-
tutionally protected liberties. 2 5 And in the case of Quebec's override of the
Court's decision in Ford, it is quite possible that the compromise enacted in
Bill 178-allowing English on interior commercial signs, but French alone
on exterior signs-would have been ruled constitutional by the Court if it
had not been immunized by means of the override. Furthermore, the more
119 Peter H. Russell, Standing Up for Notwithstanding, 29 ALBERTA L. REv. 293,294(1991).
120 See supra text accompanying note 24.
121 MANDEL, supra note 20, at 76.
122 Id at 75.
123 Id at 76.
124 RWDSU v. Govt. of Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.R. 460 (ruling that the right to freedom of
association does not include the right to strike).
125 Kahana, supra note 29, at 269.
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problematic uses of the override have all been allowed to expire when the
five-year sunset provision kicked in, which suggests that rights violations,
even when they occur under the Charter, are unlikely to persist indefinitely.
Finally, most of the areas in which the override has been exercised-
commercial signs' language, the right to strike, etc.-are undoubtedly im-
portant, but do not seem to strike at the core of personal freedom in a liberal
democracy.
Regarding the other values that systems of judicial review seek to se-
cure, however, the Canadian legislative override's performance has been
more disappointing. The override has been used only once to explicitly dis-
regard an unpopular Court decision, when "demonstrations involving up to
15,000 people. . . in the streets of Montreal" and the battle-cry, "ne touchez
pas Loi 101," prompted Quebec's legislature to override Ford v. Quebec. 26
On the numerous other occasions when controversial Court decisions have
provoked broad public opposition-e.g. R.J.R.-MacDonald27 (tobacco ad-
vertising), Morgentaler v. The Queen128 (abortion), Sauvi v. Canada129
(prisoner voting rights), etc.-no override was passed, suggesting that ma-
jority preferences on key issues were stifled by the Court's judgments. The
adoption of the override also did not lead to a richening of public discourse
or an improvement in relations among the branches of government, largely
because these effects cannot transpire when the override is used preemp-
tively (and often surreptitiously). Various commentators have noted the po-
tential of the override to stimulate dialogue and inter-branch cooperation, 1
30
but its empirical performance has been poor. In Saskatchewan and Alberta,
for instance, the preemptive use of the override stifled public discussion of
the right to strike and same-sex marriage, respectively, and prevented the
development of a constructive inter-branch discussion on those issues. As
Kent Roach notes, "[flor all intents and purposes, Alberta has stopped de-
mocratic dialogue on whether laws that restrict marriage to heterosexuals
126 ROACH, supra note 4, at 190.
127 R.J.R.-MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.RI 199.
128 Morgentaler, Smoling, and Scott v. The Queen, [1988] 1 S.C.R 30.
129 Sauv6 v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438.
130 See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 747 ("The enforced dialogue, competition, and joint
responsibility between courts and legislatures that the Commonwealth model aims to ensure
promises to add new dimension and perspective to the task of constitutional interpretation.");
Gal Dor, Constitutional Dialogues in Action: Canadian and Israeli Experiences in Compara-
tive Perspective, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (2000) ("The Notwithstanding
Clause could theoretically play a positive role in the Canadian constitutional system by pro-
moting a complex partnership through institutional dialogue between supercourts and super-
legislatures.").
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constitute unjustified discrimination against gays and lesbians."13' There was
lively debate over Quebec's override on the subject of language rights-but
this is precisely because it was the lone override to be passed retroactively
rather than preemptively.
In my view, Canada's problems with the legislative override could have
been largely avoided by the adoption of an arrangement similar to that de-
scribed in Part II. First, reserving the override power for the federal gov-
ernment alone would have prevented the notwithstanding clause from be-
coming delegitimized nationwide by its controversial use in a single
province. Instead of being available to every provincial legislature, for
whatever purpose it deemed appropriate, the override would only have been
exercised when (if ever) there was broad national support for its use. Keep-
ing the override power in the hands of Parliament could also have helped to
alleviate the ongoing tension between Quebec and the rest of Canada. With-
out a provincial legislative override, Quebec would never have expected to
be able to deviate from national constitutional norms. With section 33 in its
current form, though, there is "an unforeseen political dynamic that [may]
eventually divide Quebec and the rest of Canada,"'132 as Quebec disassociates
itself from certain Charter provisions and the rest of Canada reacts with con-
sternation to Quebec's actions. 133
Second, disallowing preemptive use of the override would have had the
clear effect of promoting public deliberation, improving inter-branch rela-
tions, and better safeguarding individual rights. If Alberta or Saskatchewan
had been forced to wait for an unfavorable Court judgment before invoking
the notwithstanding clause, the judiciary would have had the opportunity to
present its viewpoint on the law in question as persuasively as possible, me-
dia scrutiny of the override use would have been far more intense, and the
public would have been able to discuss the matter at length before the legis-
lature voted. Even if the override was eventually passed but continued to
provoke vehement criticism, as was the case with Quebec's override of Ford
v. Quebec, vigorous dialogue and enhanced inter-branch communication
would at least have transpired. Third, wording overrides differently, so that
they are passed notwithstanding the Court's interpretation of a constitutional
131 ROACH, supra note 4, at 200.
132 PATRICK MONAHAN, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHARTER, FEDERALISM, AND
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 118-19 (1987).
133 Of course, the reverse might be true as well. Without an override to let off steam, Quebec
might bridle at following national constitutional norms with which it disagrees. It is neces-
sary to weigh Quebec's potential dissatisfaction under a unitary constitutional system against
the rest of Canada's current frustration with Quebec's constitutional secessionism.
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provision rather than in spite of the clause itself, would have increased the
perceived legitimacy of the override, and made the national government
more willing to set aside Court decisions largely viewed as erroneous. Fi-
nally, a sufficiently strict supermajority requirement for override use-the
last provision argued for in Part II of this article, but missing from the Cana-
dian system--would have changed the calculations that Canadian political
actors faced before resorting to the notwithstanding clause. Knowing that
they would have to muster a supermajority to pass an override, legislators
would have been less inclined to pursue that option unless they were confi-
dent of broad public support-an element missing in the Alberta and Sas-
katchewan cases. Clearly, there are sound political reasons why an arrange-
ment akin to that introduced in Part II was not adopted in Canada in 1982,
but it does appear that an override power that was more limited in certain re-
spects would have better served Canada than its actual system of judicial re-
view.
D. Israel Revisited
The Israeli experience with the legislative override is more difficult to
evaluate than the Canadian one because the Knesset has only invoked the
notwithstanding clause once-in the very bill that prompted the clause's
adoption. Nevertheless, in the context of the Import of Frozen Meat Law, it
does not appear that the Knesset seriously considered the impact on individ-
ual rights that use of the override would have. The legislative debate fo-
cused on what provisions needed to be included in the law to satisfy the reli-
gious conservative Shas Party and convince Shas to rejoin the governing
coalition. At Shas's insistence, sections of the statute that addressed con-
cerns about meat importers' rights were actually scrapped: "During the ple-
num debate, a clause which granted compensation to importers hurt by the
law was eliminated, and the name of the law was changed to make it clear
that all types of non-kosher meat are forbidden."'' 34 The rapidity of the Knes-
set's debate, beginning after the notwithstanding clause was introduced into
the Basic Law and concluding at 4 AM that morning, also suggests that the
statute's implications for individual rights were not a major concern for leg-
islators.
By definition, the inclusion of the notwithstanding clause in the Import
of Frozen Meat Law means that the wishes of the parliamentary majority
were enacted where otherwise they would have been frustrated by the
134 Evelyn Gordon, Knesset Panel Approves Party Financing Reform, JERUSALEM POST, Mar.
17, 1994, at 2 (emphasis added).
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Court's decision. Still, there is reason to doubt that the Import of Frozen
Meat Law represented a triumph of democratic decision-making, since the
non-Shas legislators voting in favor of the bill were motivated more by a de-
sire to appease the religious parties than by genuine conviction about the
law's merits. As for fostering public discourse, the override was modestly
successful. The actual parliamentary debate over its use was disappointingly
brief, but "the battle over importation of non-Kosher meat" raged both be-
fore and after the override's use, both inside and outside the Knesset.
135
When the override expired in 1998, a more high-profile discussion ensued
about whether it should be renewed. Opponents of renewal argued that the
statute "hurt the values of the Basic Law," and that "[i]t's Kosher but it
stinks."' 136 Proponents, who eventually prevailed, contended that the law's
infringement of individual rights was minimal, and that the status quo on
non-Kosher meat importation should be maintained. 137 Unlike the override's
initial use in 1994, then, the debate over its renewal was well-informed and
infused with arguments about constitutional meaning. Finally, the override
seems to have improved inter-branch communication and cooperation in two
ways. It allowed the Court, in its subsequent decision in Meatreal v. Knes-
set, to articulate how the notwithstanding mechanism would operate in Is-
rael, and to explain that the Import of Frozen Meat Law would continue to
function despite its conflict with the right to freedom of occupation. It also
assuaged growing fears among legislators that the Court's newly claimed
power of judicial review had "set[] the stage for the court's intervention in
the legislative activity of the Knesset."'
' 38
The Knesset's very limited use of the legislative override makes rather
speculative any effort to assess how Israel's experience with the notwith-
standing clause would have differed if an arrangement like that described in
Part II had been adopted. A supermajority requirement for exercising the
override, though, would probably have contributed to a more vigorous initial
debate on attaching the notwithstanding clause to the Import of Frozen Meat
Law. It also might have galvanized opponents of the override, who knew
they had no hope of winning a simple majority vote, to make more impas-
sioned constitutional and rights-focused arguments in the hope of mustering
the support of the requisite minority of the Knesset. The fact that the Israeli
legislative override can be exercised preemptively has not yet caused any
135 Gidon Sapir, Religion and State in Israel: The Case for Reevaluation and Constitutional
Entrenchment, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 617, 640 (1999).
136 Liat Collins, Meat Law Passes Final Reading, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 19, 1998, at 4.
137 Id.
138 Dor, supra note 130, at 4.
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problems, but creates the possibility of a future Knesset shirking the terms of
the Basic Law with little discussion or public oversight. Finally, the limita-
tion of the override to the right of occupation alone means that the potential
benefits of the notwithstanding clause-less democratic debilitation, richer
public dialogue, improved inter-branch relations-are not being realized in
most areas of the Basic Law. The small number of Court decisions invali-
dating Knesset laws means that Israel has not yet confronted the full force of
the counter-majoritarian difficulty. But as Court rulings that strike statutes
due to incompatibility with the Basic Law multiply, the Knesset will have
strong incentives to broaden the scope of the notwithstanding clause beyond
the right of occupation.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE
TO DIFFERENT SETTINGS
This article has argued that the legislative override system, as pre-
sented in Part II, is superior to any other arrangement of judicial review.
This position, though, has implicitly assumed that the hypothetical country
seeking to decide which model of judicial review to adopt meets certain
conditions: a reasonably robust level of development, a coherent (or at least
not excessively fragmented) national identity, no recent history of majority
tyranny, and the presence of a legitimate and well-respected Court and na-
tional legislature-that is, conditions akin to those in contemporary Amer-
ica. What happens if these conditions are not met? Is the legislative over-
ride still preferable to all other systems of judicial review? It is to these
questions that I turn in this section. 
39
The one situation where the legislative override seems manifestly inap-
propriate is in a country that has recently experienced serious abuse of a mi-
nority group at the hands of the majority, or that has good reason to fear such
oppression in the future. 40 Under these circumstances, the overriding objec-
tive of the constitution must be to protect minority rights, and prevent future
mistreatment of the minority. Assuming that the country has democratic
elections resulting in parliamentary control for the majority, as well as robust
constitutional guarantees of individual rights, a legislative override provision
139 Shockingly little commentary exists on these questions. Paul Weiler is the only author I
have found who explicitly addresses how the most appropriate system of judicial review
might vary based on a nation's particular circumstances. See Weiler, supra note 58.
140 Some examples might be Turkey (abuse of Kurdish minority by Turkish majority); Iraq
(past abuse of Shias and Kurds by Sunnis, future danger of abuse of Sunnis by Shias); Kosovo
(past abuse of Albanians by Serbs, future danger of abuse of Serbs by Albanians); and Zim-
babwe (ongoing abuse of white minority by African majority).
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would give the majority an easy mechanism for disregarding these rights
guarantees and harming the members of the minority. The danger of oppres-
sion is especially great if the country has a unicameral parliamentary system,
where the approval of a majority or supermajority in one legislative chamber
is all that is needed to exercise the override.14' Depending on the depth of
hostility between the majority and minority, it is true that U.S.-style judicial
review also may not shield the minority from majority tyranny. In the fa-
mous words of Learned Hand, "[1]iberty lies in the hearts of men and
women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it.'
' 42
Still, there is no reason to make the effectuation of majority oppression eas-
ier than it would be in a system where courts have the final word on laws'
constitutionality-an effect that the legislative override would unfortunately
have under these difficult conditions.
Conversely, the legislative override system is most apposite when there
is a relatively low probability that the majority will deliberately violate mi-
nority rights. As Paul Weiler writes, the legislative override "rests on the as-
sumption that the chief threat to rights... comes from legislative thoughtless-
ness about particular intrusions .... [It] contemplates no serious danger of
outright legislative oppression; certainly none sufficient to concede ultimate
authority to ... judges and lawyers.' ' 143 When the risk of majority tyranny is
low, then, the legislature can be trusted to use the override in more salutary
fashion-not to infringe individual rights, but to express its disagreement
with the Court when the Court has reached an unpopular judgment on the
basis of a controversial interpretation of the constitution. Empirical evi-
dence, rather than any a priori theory, must ultimately be relied upon to de-
termine the risk of majority tyranny, and hence the relative appeal of the leg-
islative override for a given country.
A second variable that bears on the applicability of the legislative over-
ride is the relative legitimacy of the legislature and Court in a particular
country. The override is least appropriate when the legislature has been dis-
credited due to its past actions-such as abuses of rights, corruption, or gen-
eral incompetence-but the courts are considered more fair and professional.
141 Other electoral mechanisms making it easier to pass laws would have similar effects. Leg-
islative majorities are far easier to form in a first-past-the-post system, for example, than a
proportional representation system. On the other hand, features that make it more difficult to
pass laws-bicameral legislatures, presidential veto power, etc.-have the obvious effect of
making the override more difficult to employ.
142 Learned Hand, Speech at "I Am an American Day" Ceremony, Central Park, New York
City (May 21, 1944).
143 Weiler, supra note 58, at 84.
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In these situations (e.g. post-apartheid South Africa, post-communist Hun-
gary), U.S.-style judicial review is probably the best arrangement, as people
are likely to distrust the legislature and side with the courts in any inter-
branch dispute over constitutional meaning. On the other hand, countries
that have traditions of strong and effective legislatures, but where courts
have played little historical role in the exposition of constitutional values, are
especially fertile ground for the legislative override system. In these nations
(e.g. Britain, pre-Charter Canada, pre-Basic Law Israel), the transition from
no judicial review to essentially unchallengeable judicial review would be
needlessly jarring, and would provoke howls of protest from disempowered
legislators. A shift to a legislative override arrangement, however, would be
politically smoother, and a better reflection of the relative institutional ca-
pacity and authority of the government's branches.
A final factor that should influence a country's decision whether to
adopt the legislative override is the magnitude of the transition costs of
switching from one system of judicial review to another. A country that is
drafting a constitution from scratch and that has little historical attachment to
any particular judicial review model can evaluate rival regimes strictly on
their merits. A country that already possesses a functional judicial review
system, though, must take into account the costs it would incur in transition-
ing to the legislative override. First, beneficiaries of the status quo-for ex-
ample, legislators in a parliamentary system, and the judiciary as well as par-
ties who have prevailed in constitutional litigation in a regime of U.S.-style
judicial review-would probably oppose a switch to the override. The par-
liamentary legislators and U.S.-style judges would both experience a relative
loss of power in an override system, while parties who have benefited from
Court decisions would have those favorable rulings suddenly subject (at least
in theory) to legislative revision. Second, there is a significant uncertainty
cost to adopting a new arrangement of judicial review. This article has ar-
gued throughout that the legislative override model would sufficiently pro-
tect fundamental rights, but a country cannot verify that claim until well after
it has implemented its new system. For countries that are not drafting con-
stitutions behind a veil of ignorance, then, the legislative override should
only be adopted when its benefits (greater democratic expression, improved
public discourse, more constructive inter-branch relations) outweigh both its
disadvantages (slightly less protection for individual rights, more legal insta-
bility) and the inevitable transition costs incurred in switching systems of ju-
dicial review. 144
144 It is worth pointing out that the transition costs incurred in switching from either judicial or
legislative supremacy to the override are smaller than those incurred in shifting from one pole
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Assuming that a country has decided to adopt the override, it then faces
the further question of whether all the provisions described in Part II are ap-
propriate for its situation. In my view, most parts of the override package
should always be implemented when it has been determined that the override
is the preferred arrangement of judicial review for a country. Two of the
package's elements, though, may be applicable in some contexts but not
suitable in others. First, the exclusive allocation of the override power to the
federal government is sensible when a country possesses a unified national
identity. In this case, allowing federal subunits to disregard Court decisions
can undermine the development of national constitutional norms, and facili-
tate the violation of rights by ill-motivated local majorities. Even if a coun-
try is divided along ethnic, religious, or racial lines, making some form of
federalism a logical choice, the benefits derived from a single constitutional
culture will often outweigh the subunits' understandable desire to decide for
themselves whether to follow federal Court decisions. But there must come
a point at which this calculus reverses, and it becomes preferable to bestow
the override power to the subunits. As in Canada, the subunits may insist on
the override power as a condition for their joining the new constitutional or-
der. Alternatively, it may be clear that the constitutional norms that much of
the nation embraces would create endless resentment in one or more subunits
(e.g. if Christians in Nigeria had to follow Islamic Sharia law, or if Kurds in
Iraq had to dismantle the separate governing structures they created over the
course of the 1990s). In these situations, a subunit override power is simply
a manifestation of the country's political realities-not the cause, but rather
the result of, an existing centrifugal dynamic.
Second, the applicability of the override to all indeterminate provisions
of the constitution (except for those regulating the electoral process) is ap-
propriate in most cases. While it may be theoretically preferable to distin-
guish between "core" and "non-core" rights, of which only the latter would
be susceptible to legislative override, this distinction is impossible in prac-
tice. Any right designated as "core"-free speech, for example, or due proc-
ess of law-would inevitably include both "core" and "non-core" aspects of
personal liberty. 45 If the legislature is to have the power to override the
to the other. The Canadian and Israeli transition costs in switching from legislative suprem-
acy to the override, for instance, do not appear to have been inordinately large. While no
country has moved from U.S.-style judicial review to the override, the transition costs of such
a move should also not be excessive. Courts would still exercise their power of judicial re-
view, but there would be a new wrinkle in that their rulings would occasionally be set aside
through the override.
145 For example, the right to publish articles critical of the government is surely much more
fundamental than the right to wear a jacket saying "Fuck the draft" in a courthouse, yet both
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Court's judgments in "non-core" settings, there is no way to selectively strip
it of the authority to use the override in "core" situations as well. This ar-
gument may fail, however, with regard to countries that are willing to tie the
legislature's hands in some "non-core" contexts, in order to eliminate any
danger that the legislature will use the override in a particular "core" situa-
tion. Canada, for instance, placed educational rights outside the reach of the
notwithstanding clause, so that no legislative majority could undermine par-
ents' ability to have their children educated in either English or French.
More significantly, countries that have undergone terrible periods of oppres-
sion, but have nevertheless chosen to adopt a legislative override system,
may wish to exempt certain rights from the override's scope. Following the
example of postwar Germany, provisions relating to human dignity and de-
mocracy may be situated outside the override's reach, and even beyond con-
stitutional amendment. This selective application of the override cannot be
done without a cost-namely, that the many benefits of the override will not
accrue in the areas that are exempted from its reach-but this is a price that
certain countries may be willing to pay.
What this means is that the legislative override system, as outlined in
Part II, is not necessarily appropriate in every circumstance. In many situa-
tions-as long as there is no legacy of majority tyranny, the legislature has
sufficient legitimacy, and the country is not excessively fractured-the ad-
vantages of the override should easily outweigh the disadvantages. But there
are clearly some situations where the override arrangement must be tweaked
before it can be instituted, and still other contexts where the legislative over-
ride is inappropriate to begin with. There are few universal truths in the
arena of comparative constitutional design, so it should be unsurprising that
the best system of judicial review varies across time and place.
CONCLUSION
This article began by describing the range of judicial review systems in
use around the world, and observing how dramatically the fate of two hypo-
thetical statutes could vary across the various systems. The four Parts of the
article then introduced a variant of the Canadian/Israeli legislative override
model, and argued that this variant is generally the optimal arrangement of
judicial review. Part I summarized the Canadian and Israeli experiences
with the override. Part II outlined the key components of the override sys-
are protected by the First Amendment. We might want the government to be able to use the
override only in the latter case, but it is virtually impossible to see what constitutional word-
ing would allow this result.
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tern in what I consider to be its ideal form, and positioned the override
within the academic literature on judicial review. Part III contended that the
override system is superior to its primary rivals in terms of the values it se-
cures and the institutional incentives it generates, and provided further
analysis of the Canadian and Israeli examples. Finally, Part IV discussed the
contexts in which the override system may not actually be the best choice for
a given country.
The cynical observer may ask what the point is of adding yet another
option to the growing roster of judicial review models. With the United
States, Canada, Britain, New Zealand, and Germany all already serving as
templates for different systems, is there really a need for still another ar-
rangement? The answer is twofold. First, countries engaged in constitu-
tional drafting have a strong interest in selecting a judicial review system
that is not just workable-as all the existing models surely are-but optimal.
If the arguments I have presented on behalf of the legislative override have
merit, then this article's proposed system is of more relevance to countries in
the throes of constitutional debate than any extant judicial review model.
Second, there is a tendency in the United States (and other countries
with entrenched judicial supremacy) to overlook what Stephen Gardbaum
has termed the "new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism.' ' 46 Be-
cause the Canadian, modern British, and New Zealand judicial review sys-
tems all evolved in traditionally parliamentary countries, American scholars
have been slow to recognize that those systems prove that there is a contin-
uum between judicial and legislative ascendancy rather than two opposite
poles. 147 This article's proposed arrangement-which arises from an ex ante
analysis of the values that judicial review systems seek to secure, rather than
any particular country's history-may dramatize to the American audience
the conceptual space that exists between U.S.-style judicial review and his-
toric British parliamentary sovereignty. In comparative judicial review, as in
much else, there exists a "third way" that promises to capture many of both
poles' benefits while avoiding many of their costs. The more attention that
this middle road receives, the better.
146 Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 707.
147Id at 708-10.
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